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Executive Summary:
 More effective support for the Kurdish and Syrian opposition is necessary to fight the 
threat of ISIS and to move the Syrian conflict toward a possible solution by helping to 
unite a fractured political opposition and by changing Iran’s calculus on the long-term 
benefits of supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 
 The eventual success of military efforts undertaken by the UK government and its 
Western and regional partners in rolling back ISIS influence on the ground will 
facilitate the group’s transformation into a transnational movement mirroring al-
Qaeda and thus increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the wider Middle East and the 
West.  
 Any long-term strategy to fight ISIS and other Islamist extremist groups must involve 
the development of more inclusive religious discourses and the opening of political 
space for secular liberals and moderate Islamists across the Arab world.
What are the threats represented by ISIL, other militant groups and the Assad regime, 
politically, ideologically and militarily in Iraq and Syria? How might they evolve?
ISIS
1) ISIS poses a clear threat to the physical integrity of Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s claim to 
establish an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ covering both countries is at odds with the general 
Western interest in maintaining existing borders in the region and the specific 
commitment to the democratically elected government of Iraq. The resulting refugee 
flows put neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey under increasing pressure with 
potential ramifications for the national security of these countries. 
2) In addition, the deliberate killing of civilians and unarmed prisoners of war, the brutal 
mistreatment of women, religious minorities, and everybody else who does not follow 
their narrow interpretation of Islam, as well as the indoctrination of children on their 
way to becoming child soldiers - all documented by the United Nations and 
international NGOs (Brannen 2014) - raise questions about the international 
community’s moral obligations to the civilian populations of Iraq and Syria. 
3) Regionally, ISIS’ rhetorical focus on erasing the borders drawn by the World War I 
British-French Sykes-Picot agreement prompted some observers to regard ISIS’s 
initial advances along largely Sunni areas as heralding the reshaping of the Middle 
East according to ‘religious dividing lines (rather) than the old imperial conveniences 
of 100 years ago’ (Ashdown 2014). In fact, academic research has claimed that the 
Middle East’s enduring instability directly results from Western attempts at ‘deterring 
or preventing state-building wars from being fought to successful conclusions across 
existing Middle Eastern boundaries’ (Lustick 1997). Of course, it would be wrong to 
regard ISIS’s vision of an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ which covers (at least) the current states 
of Syria and Iraq as offering a genuine chance of producing a more stable regional 
order. If we follow Anderson’s notion of nations as ‘imagined communities’, then 
ISIS’s religious nationalism is as artificial as any other Baathist, Arab nationalist or 
Islamist political project. While religious and national identities have been 
instrumentalized in political power struggles in the Middle East and beyond, it would 
be politically dangerous and strategically ill-advised to fall into the trap of Orientalist 
essentialism and reduce people to their supposedly primordial cultural and religious 
attributes. Of course, for many people in the region, categories such as ‘Sunni’, 
‘Shia’, ‘Arab’ or ‘Persian’ have real meaning. But the political implications of such 
identities are fluid and do not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to preventing 
people of different faiths and ethnicities from living together. The break-up of Syria 
and Iraq is not inevitable.
4) In assessing the current or future threat which ISIS poses at the global level, it is 
worthwhile to contemplate the nature of the group’s rationality. Following Abrahms 
(2004) study of whether the use of terrorist political violence can be considered 
rational, we need to distinguish between ‘procedural’ rationality in terms of specific 
tactics and political messaging and ‘substantive’ rationality in terms of the overall 
political aims. If we, first, assume that ISIS’s ‘procedural rationality’ does indeed 
reflect a larger ‘substantive rationality’ then its ‘state-building’ project, as evidenced 
most recently in the decision to issue its own currency and its hierarchical political 
structure, might end in a clearly-marked political entity which would react in a 
rational, and thus largely predictable manner, to the constraints of the international 
and regional political systems. In fact, ISIS would not be the first political movement 
which has effectively used the full range of political violence from terrorism against 
civilian targets, guerrilla attacks on military targets, to the state terror intimidation of 
populations under its control in the process of state-building. In addition, the 
characteristics of an established ‘Islamic State’ effectively controlled and run by ISIS 
such as dependence on oil revenues, religious chauvinism that also serves as an 
inspiration for regional and global terrorist groups and a ruthless political 
authoritarianism would make it appear rather similar to one or two existing and 
internationally well-connected Arab countries. In this reading, the gruesome 
beheadings of Western hostages should be regarded as failed attempts to intimidate 
Western publics into pressuring their political representatives into withholding or 
withdrawing their consent for military action. These acts of violence would thus fit 
into the broader pattern of terrorist attacks actually stiffening, instead of undermining 
the targeted publics’ and policymakers’ resolve (Abrahms 2014). 
5) If, however, we assume, second, that ISIS’s procedural rationality cannot disguise its 
substantive irrationality, then the abduction and murder of Western civilians would 
follow the established terrorist strategy of provocation (Kydd/Walter 2006) according 
to which a politically weak (as measured in public support) non-state actor would 
provoke a government into over-reacting so that the non-state actor’s target audience 
would view the targeted government as the aggressor and not the terrorist 
organization which initiated violence. This could reflect ISIS’s rational interest in 
boosting the numbers of its supporters on the way toward achieving the irrational aim 
of bringing about an apocalyptic showdown between (its version of) ‘Islam’ and its 
perceived enemies. While the US/British track record in post-conflict stabilization in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya is not without its critics, a rational examination of the 
powerful joined impact of superior Western airpower and local fighting forces in the 
2001 Afghanistan and the 2011 Libya campaigns should have made ISIS wary of 
setting in motion exactly the kind of cooperation between the US and UK 
governments as well as Iraqi and Kurdish forces we have witnessed since August 
2014. Provoking a military confrontation with the US at this stage would thus only 
make sense if ISIS regarded a direct confrontation with the West as inevitable. This 
interpretation of the beheadings of Western hostages would thus lead to the 
conclusion that ISIS’s ideological outlook might not be too different from al-Qaeda’s 
global, confrontational agenda. 
Al-Qaida and local Affiliates: Al-Nusra Front/Khorasan Group
6) Of course, ISIS and al-Qaeda differ in a number of important ways. First and 
foremost, ISIS has achieved something which Al-Qaeda has never been able to 
achieve on its own, the control of territory. Lacking a physical base after the ouster of 
the Taliban regime in 2001, Al-Qaeda had to follow the quintessential terrorist 
strategy of aiming to ‘control the mind’ of its (Western) target audiences via the 
spread of fear whereas ISIS can rely (so far) on its ability to control territory. This 
also allows ISIS to project to potential recruits from across the Arab world and 
beyond the chance to live in a ‘perfect’ ‘Islamic’ system. Those willing to accept the 
ISIS narrative can thus see themselves as participating in a religious project of 
historical significance. 
7) The attractiveness of the ISIS brand within the shared pool of potential recruits 
explains why al-Qaeda can be assumed to be desperate for a ‘successful’ terrorist 
attack in the West. Ayman al-Zawahiri is reported to have been rather quick to realize 
the potential of the Syrian conflict in facilitating the recruitment of Western jihadi 
volunteers, their indoctrination and military training on the way toward creating a new 
cohort of battle-hardened terrorists who would be able to succeed the earlier al-Qaeda 
generation which Western counterterrorism efforts decimated so effectively after 
9/11. 
8) This seems to have been the purpose behind the establishment of the ‘Khorasan’ 
group within the al-Nusra Front which was led by Muhsin al-Fadli. Al-Fadli is 
described by the US and UN as a close confident of former Al-Qaeda leader Osama 
Bin Laden as well as a facilitator of the activities of Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, late 
leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The US government also considers him as having been 
involved in the 2009 and 2010 attempted terrorist attacks on US airliners. The US 
government has so far not confirmed whether al-Fadli died in the strikes against the 
‘Khorasan’ group which marked the beginning of the US-led air campaign in Syria in 
September 2014. 
9) At the same time, if ISIS viewed itself as heading for a global confrontation with the 
US anyway, an ISIS-led or –inspired attack in the West would offer benefits to this 
group as well. It would demonstrate its global reach amid criticism from other radical 
Islamists (not just affiliated with al-Qaeda) that ISIS is focusing too much on fighting 
fellow Muslims and not enough on fighting ‘the West’ as the main enemy. The onset 
of the Western military campaign, in particular, would provide ISIS with the chance 
to frame such an attack as an act of self-defence which, actually, might have been 
inspired by a self-serving interest in outbidding al-Qaeda. Indeed, if ISIS were to 
suffer military losses at a scale that would substantially diminish its geographical grip 
on Sunni territories in Syria and Iraq, its leaders would have an incentive to maintain 
global relevance by morphing the organization into the kind of transnational global 
network pioneered by al-Qaeda. Al-Baghdadi’s audio message from 13 November 
2014 offered first evidence of a shift in this direction. Not only does al-Baghdadi take 
note of the pledges of allegiance from radical Islamist groups across the region, he 
also calls upon his followers to ‘erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere’ and assures 
them that their march will continue until they ‘reach Rome’. With the sheers numbers 
of Arab and Western volunteers involved and ISIS’s emphasis on indoctrinating 
young children the ripple effect of the rise and eventual demise of ISIS could last for 
generations (Brannen 2014).
Ahrar al-Sham
10) The Ahrar al-Sham group is one of the largest Syrian opposition groups. On the one 
hand, it claims to pursue a decidedly local agenda which focuses on toppling Bashar 
al-Assad and setting up an Islamic system of governance within Syria. In this, it 
competed with ISIS which assassinated Ahhrar al-Sham’s leader Abu Khalid al-Suri 
in a suicide bombing in early 2014. At the same time, Abu Khalid had close personal 
links to Al-Qaeda members such as Ayman az-Zawahiri dating back to his time in 
Afghanistan. Media reports even suggested that Al-Zawahiri had named Abu Khalid 
as his delegate to Syria. 
Assad regime
11) The Syrian regime has proven very skilful at exploiting the Western community’s 
reluctance to get involved in another military operation in the Middle East. Lacking 
any respect for the rights of the Syrian civilian population, it has calibrated its ruthless 
repression in such a way as to avoid, so far, a direct military confrontation with the 
West (Leenders 2013). Together with the West’s unwillingness to engage more 
directly with Syria’s moderate opposition, this strategy weakened and almost 
eliminated any meaningful non-Islamist opposition. 
The Government has emphasised that military action is dependent on an internal political 
solution and a regional solution involving other states. What are the components of this 
solution, how can the Government work to achieve them and what is the likelihood of 
success?
Short-term
12) ISIS strength relies quite heavily on its ability to intimidate local populations into 
supporting the group or at least into refraining from joining forces with ISIS’s 
enemies. This explains the pattern of brutal massacres committed against Sunni 
villagers and tribes who dared to reject ISIS’s presence or style of governing (Sly 
2014). The aura of invincibility also serves as an important element of ISIS’s global 
marketing. This is why achieving military successes in high-profile theatres such as 
Kobane is crucial. With Western boots on the ground out of the question for the 
foreseeable future, any Western military air campaign has to be accompanied by 
cooperation with local troops who are not just well-equipped and well-trained enough 
to make use of the opportunities which successful Western airstrikes create, but who 
also enjoy the support of the local population. Successful counterinsurgency not only 
requires the counterinsurgent to portray the ability to protect the local population from 
the insurgents. The local population must also view the counterinsurgent as respecting 
and serving their political and economic interests (Galula 1963). This is why the 
professionalization and diversification of the Iraqi army is of such crucial importance.
13) In Syria, the UK and its allies need to redouble their efforts to support Kurdish and 
Sunni opposition fighting forces. This would also help protect the Syrian civilian 
population from simply swapping the Scylla of ISIS atrocities with the Charybdis of 
Syrian regime repression. More direct support for the Kurdish and Syrian opposition 
could also help address at least some of the characteristics which make the Syrian 
conflict likely to last for a long time. First, long-lasting civil wars have been marked 
by a fractured political landscape. A smaller number of actors on opposing sides and 
greater political and military capacity of individual groups have been shown to reduce 
the duration of civil wars (Cunningham et. al. 2009). Here, Western unwillingness to 
engage with the Free Syrian Army has meant that it could not unite the opposition in a 
way that would make its military efforts more effective and increase its ability to 
implement any possible political agreement (Schulhofer-Wohl 2014).
14)  Second, the active involvement of foreign sponsors not only greatly increases the 
chances of non-actors committing violence against civilians (Saleyhan et.al. 2014), 
but also helps prolong civil wars (Saleyhan 2007). Here, again, US/UK facilitation of 
the political consolidation and increased military effectiveness of moderate Syrian 
opposition and Kurdish fighters could make a difference. If the first two years of the 
conflict were any indication, then Damascus’s sponsors in Russia and Iran are quite 
willing to contemplate a solution to the conflict which would not necessarily involve 
Bashar al-Assad if this is seen as serving their interests. If the UK and its allies were 
able to assist the Kurdish and Sunni opposition in achieving meaningful military 
success, concerns about Syria turning into Hezbollah’s ‘Vietnam’ could move Tehran 
toward a rather pragmatic approach concerning Syria’s future domestic set-up.
15) For David Cohen (2014), Undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, ISIS is the ‘best-funded terrorist organization’ the 
world has ever confronted. This makes it clear that any successful short-term military 
action against ISIS needs to be complemented with vigorous efforts to undermine or 
cut off the group’s revenue streams. This would entail making it more difficult for 
ISIS to continue generating up to a reported $1.6 million in daily oil revenues (Lynch 
2014), as US airstrikes have already begun to achieve, by attacking or recapturing oil 
installations under its control. Equally important is increased pressure on those 
networks that facilitate the smuggling of oil into Turkey. 
16) Successful operations against ISIS’ oil business would increase its reliance on illicit 
taxation in territories under its control and on external donors (Lister 2014). It would 
appear that better trained Iraqi army units as well as the closer coordination with 
better equipped Kurdish Peshmerga and Free Syrian Army fighters could help achieve 
the territorial gains necessary to undermine ISIS’s income from illicit taxes. This 
would leave the UK and its allies with the task of exerting diplomatic pressure on 
Arab Gulf countries to ensure that the new legislation recently introduced by these 
governments makes an effective contribution to reducing ISIS’s income from private 
donors (Dickinson 2014). 
17) The progress in rolling back ISIS’s influence is likely to be, at best, gradual. Insights 
from existing research on the impact of successful decapitation strikes on the rate of 
collapse of terrorist organizations (Jordan 2009) would indicate that ISIS is an 
unlikely candidate for a rapid demise even in the event of a successful targeted killing 
of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other senior figures. The rate of collapse for a terrorist 
organization suffering a successful decapitation strike between 1945 and 2004 stands 
at only five out of 116 for religious groups and at only four out of 46 for groups with 
a membership of more than 10,000. ISIS’s main Achilles heel appears to be its 
relatively young age, with 38 out of 131 groups younger than ten years collapsing 
after such a strike (Jordan 2009).
18) More important is the engagement of Iraq’s and Syria’ Sunni tribes following the 
example of the successful ‘Sunni awakening’ in the years 2005 and 2006 against al-
Qaeda in Iraq, one of ISIS’s precursor organizations (Knights 2014). It is a telling 
sign of the sources of ISIS’s strengths and weaknesses that its advances have been 
most rapid in those Sunni areas which suffer the most from political and economic 
marginalization (Hubbard 2014). The engagement of Sunni tribes against ISIS would 
thus have to go hand in hand with assisting the Iraqi government in building a more 
inclusive political, military and economic structure.
Long-term
19) At the broadest political level, radical Islamism of the ISIS and al-Qaeda types is the 
result of a century-long fragmentation of the religious sphere (Roy 2004) in the 
Muslim world in which traditional religious elites have gradually lost influence over 
how individual Muslim believers view their faith and associated norms. It is thus no 
coincidence that the Middle East stands out globally as the region with the smallest 
median number of people expressing confidence in religious elites (40% regionally 
versus 69% globally) (Pew 2014). This development opened the door for a new range 
of discourses ranging from liberal Muslim, to moderate Islamist and radical Islamist. 
While it is not the job of Western policy-makers to decide, on behalf of Muslims, 
what the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam is, the UK and its allies can play a crucial 
role in helping empower those who represent an enlightened, peaceful interpretation 
of Islam at ease with the challenges of modernity. 
20) This should occur as part of two-pronged policy: First, the UK and its allies need to 
speak out against the spread of ultra-conservative and reactionary interpretations of 
Islam by public and private sources in Saudi Arabia. It is no coincidence that ISIS saw 
it fit to utilize, without any major changes, religious textbooks currently in use in 
Saudi Arabia (Marmouri 2014). This is possible in the context of ISIS representing an 
‘untamed Wahhabism’ (Haykel in Kirkpatrick 2014), the official religious doctrine in 
Saudi Arabia. 
21) Second, the UK and its allies need to pressure the government of Egypt, as well as 
Cairo’s allies in Saudi Arabia and in the UAE, into abandoning the ruthless repression 
of all forms of peaceful political dissent. Making political prisoners out of secular 
liberals and moderate Islamists closes an important avenue for the development of a 
more peaceful, cooperative and human rights respecting regional political culture. 
Nothing seems to validate al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s narratives more effectively than the 
brutal counterrevolutions occurring across the Arab world (Berger 2014). The 
rhetorical and intelligence support which ‘moderate’ Arab regimes such as Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Egypt are offering for the fight against ISIS 
should not distract Western policy-makers from the fact that it was their domestic 
short-comings, and their inability to excel in anything other than repression, which 
continue to set the stage for groups like ISIS to emerge (Hamid 2014). Therefore, the 
rise of ISIS should not be regarded as resulting from some more or less arbitrary 
drawing of borders over one hundred years ago, but from the failure of Arab leaders 
to build effective and legitimate government structures within them.
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